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Reliability by Design
Abstract
Gentlemen, it is my privilege to spend a few minutes with you tonight. I'd like to thank ARPA, the Air Force,
and the Rockwell Science Center for the invitation to share a little bit of what I call the "new look" in the Navy.
I'm really here tonight on behalf of the Navy, and particularly on behalf of Admiral Michaelis who is the Chief
of Naval Material. The story I have to tell you is one that I think you will find somewhat enlightening. I know
you'll find some of it amusing, but I hope that the overall message will be that the Navy has undertaken a
program to improve its fleet readiness and has undertaken it as a very serious proposition.
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 REL IABILITY BY DESI GN 
W. J . Willoughby , Jr. 
Ass i s tant Deputy Chi ef of Naval Material 
(Reliabi lity and Enqineering) 
Headquarters Naval Material Command 
Washi ngt on , DC 2D360 
With Intl'oducticn 
by 
Hana VandePVeldt 
Department of the Navy 
NavaL Soo Systems CormJand 
Good evening. The keynote ad.dPesa tonight addl'esses a topic in which aZZ of you are extl'emeLy 
interested. That topic is reliability by design. To present to you svme thoughts on the NaV!J ' s approach 
to this idea, we have with uo pl'obabLy t he foreroost authority in the Navy fol' the establishment of policy 
and progl'ams in this area, a man who i s the Deputy Chief of the Navl' l.faun•ials Corrrnand fo'I' l'eliability 
and maintainability. Ml'. Willis J . 'Yilloughby is exceedingly well qualified fol' this position. He has 
some 22 year>s of e:r:perience that rQ179eO from basic engineering to design to engineering management, 
a very impo:r>tant function itself, and prier to accepting this position with the Navy, he was Directo:r> 
of reliability, quality, control, and safety for the manned spaceflight program of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Acbninistration ' s Apollo Program. It was the success of this program which bl'OughL 
Ml'. WiLloughby to the Navy 'a attention and to Admiral Isaac Kidd in pal'ticulal' . AW7n:'I'nl KidJJ, who was 
the corrrnander, the Chief of Naval Material, invited him to come with the Navy to establish the prog:r>am, 
the policies, and the procedw>es necesl!lll'y to improve the reliability and maintainabil-ity of ow• fleet 
afloat. He has been able to bring a naw look to the Nav.11 in this a:r>ea quite successfully, and he is 
getting a Lot of attention. He has formalized, and this is a very important step in the Navy, a new 
approach for building vehicles and issuing an instl'Uction which deals with reLiability of navaL 
materiaL. He has r-eceived the ApoUo Cl'oup Achievement Awaru and the NASA Exceptional Sel'vice Neda'L . 
I think I have taLked long enough, so t.ri.thout further delay, it is my privilege to introduce to 1/0U 
Mr. WiZZis .J . Willoughby . 
5 
RELIABILITY BY DESIGN 
W. J. Willoughby, Jr. 
Assistant Deputy Chief of !laval Material 
(Reliability and Engineering) 
Headquarters Naval Materia 1 Co11111and 
Washing ton, DC 20360 
Gentlemen, it is my privilege to spend a few 
minutes with you ton1ght. I'd like to thank ARPA, 
the Air Force, and the Rockwell Science Center for 
the invitation to share a little bit of what I call 
the "new look" in the llavy. I'm really here to-
night on behalf of the Navy, and particularly on 
behalf of Admiral Michaelis who is the Chief of 
Naval Material. The stor~ I have to tel l you is 
one that I think you will find someWiat enlighten-
ing. I know you'll find some of it amusing, but I 
hope that the overall message will be that the Navy 
has undertaken a program to improve its fleet readi-
ness and has undertaken it as a very serious 
proposition. 
A story comes to mind that I tllink ts appro-
priate to this particular gathering, especially 
since I've seen a number of you before in various 
places as you represent companies, universities, 
or the Government. This story came to me recently. 
It relates to an old lady who is getting ready to 
get on a train. She saw the conductor making sig-
nals to the engineer. The lady walted up to him 
and said she would like to know what he was doing. 
He was pretty gr001py and the train was late, so he 
turned to her and said , "Lady, when I do that kind 
of a thing, I'm telling the engineer to get the 
hell out of here." So with that, ht wa 1 ked off in 
a huff. The little lady got on the train and sat 
down. A little later, the conductor began thinking 
about it and realized that he had been a little 
rude. He decided he would apologlzt to her. As he 
approached the 1 ady and star ted to say that he was 
sorry, sne made tne same signa 1 s he had made to the 
engineer. In some respects, I think thal's the way 
1 approach so111e uf yuu--H's time to get the hell 
out of here. 
Uondestructive testing came to me a long time 
ago and I never really knew what H was. My 
fatner was an executive with the Atlantic Coast 
Line Rail road. tlack in the 30's, I can remember 
my pride when my father took me out to the rail-
road shops one day and showed me a thing called 
the Sperry Car. That's, of course, the device 
that the rail roads run up and down the tracks to 
check the rails. I had never seen it. I took a 
little ride out on i t. I d1dn't know what was so 
impressive about it except for its being so small. 
I could see papers being run throu1! something and 
wiggles being made. From that, sonebody was tell-
ing me, it was a remark&ble thing. I later en-
countered the same kind of an experience, only this 
time il was much more serious. 
On the Apollo program, we leamed a lesson 
about t1tanium and methanol. As you know by now, 
titanium and methanol don't m1x. Wt didn't know 
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it at the ti~. One night at home I got a tele-
phone call at 11:00 p.m., and it was similar to 
the story of the train, only they were telling me 
to get the hell out to Downey. A titanium tank 
had exploded. A launch tank had it on board. 
Actually, it ,.as a dock tank, but nobody quite 
knew what had happened. We were all scared because 
we were approaching launch date. We didn't know 
what was really going on, but when we found out 
what happened we were even more scared because we 
heard of things for the first time called flaw 
sizes, growth rates, progression rates, all sorts 
of things--eventually termed stress corrosion. 
Most frightening to us at that time was that we 
had bought all the titanium tanks we were going to 
buy. So there we were with a buy of titaniua 
tanks on our hands and an Apollo launch pretty 
nearly at hand. 
A lot of excited people began to get into the 
act, and I found rri}'Self facing some very learned 
peop 1 e who very quick 1 y became even more 1 earned 
about a thing called stress corrosion in titanium. 
They finally wound up convincing us that they 
understood the fracture mechanics well enough that 
they could tell us not only the flaw size , but the 
growth rate. We were being assured as we were 
putting that thing together on the pad that for 
every pressure cycle we put on it, the growth rate 
would be thus and so. The people would stand up 
in front of our flight readiness reviews and say 
the growth is thus and so, and when we get to the 
moon it will be this big, and when you get back 
home it will be this big. "But don't worry, 
fellows, it isn't going to hurt you," they said. 
That was news to me and I went home every night 
saying, "I 110nder if those fools know what they're 
ta 1 king about?" I didn't kllow, NASA dl dn' t know, 
but the more data we collected, the more we became 
convinced that that was what was happening. 
We could live with a flaw of a particular size, 
and as a matter of fact, we did. Before every 
mission we flew, we determined what flaw sizes we 
had in the tanks and the projected time they were 
going to last and how many pressure cycles we could 
put on them. After that experience, I came to have 
a very deep appreciation for the science of stress 
corrosion, ~tal fatigue, and nondestructive 
testing, It was a "bath" that I had never taken 
before; it 1es a "bath" I never want to take again 
because it was a very worrisome thing for us ~11. 
There was just no way we could demonstrate com-
pletely that we were right. We had a very fine 
group of engineers and a very fine group of indus-
trial support people who, I think, did an out-
standing job; and we learned to live in their 
confidence. It was hard to do at first because we 
weren't trained for that. When we had things that 
weren't right, we simply stomped them out. 
With that memory in mind, I'd like to share 
with you tonight what I think to be an exciting 
evolution, or revolution, that ' s taking place with-
in the Naval Material Command and within the Navy 
as a whole. I would like to bring to your atten-
tion what it can mean to the nondestructive te~t 
community, and later on will summarize some of the 
observations that I have made. 
I came to the Navy at their invitation kicking 
and screaming all the way. I became involved with 
the Navy by accident, strictly by accident. A 
friend of Admiral Isaac Kidd , then Chief of Naval 
Material, had known Alan Shepard . Alan came to me 
one day and said, "Wi 11, the Navy's having an awful 
lot of trouble with fleet readiness and reliability. 
I think you should go over there and talk to them 
a little bit and just see 1f there's any way you 
can shed light on their problem." So I went over 
there one day during lunch and spent some ti.e with 
them. The result was that I agreed to do a quick 
study for the Navy--to say to them that if we, NASA, 
were doing this job, this is how we would be doing 
it versus how they were doing 1t. That was the 
gist of the thing. I took about seven people (this 
was just before Apollo 17 so I had to hurry) and 
spent three days on this project. We pi cked a sam-
ple of equipment that the Navy selected and re-
viewed it at the contractor's site . We reviewed 
their procurement cycle and thei r contract. The 
result was that we told the Navy we just wouldn't 
have done it that way. "We don't believe that the 
hardware you get is really going to do the job for 
you when you do it this way." 
As a result of that, I was asked to give a 
presentation to what the Navy calls the "General 
Board," which is a large group of the admiralty 
who gather periodically to pay homage to the Navy. 
I stood before that group not knowing what was 
really in store for me. At the end of that presen-
tation, Admi ra 1 Ki dd sa1 d to me, "Will, I expect 
you to report on board in two weeks." Not being 
too swift, I thought a minute and said, "The Navy's 
here, NASA's there; I don't think you can really 
say that." I smiled and said, "That's a very kind 
invitation, thank you," and left. The Navy contin-
ued insistent, and letters flew back and forth 
between NASA and the Navy. I can remenber vividly 
when the letters kept coming from higher and 
higher authorities. Finally, they wen! on secre-
tarial levels and White House levels. My manage-
ment came to me each time saying, "What do you 
want us to do about this?" I said, "let's use 
Navy tenninology. let's tighten up the line, let's 
throw out an anchor; but whatever you do, fellows, 
don't tum loose of me." I said , "I've seen those 
g~s over there and, believe you me, they couldn't 
win 1f they had to." That went on for awhile. 
Finally, the NASA administrator came to me and 
said, "Really, I don't know what you've done over 
there, but you don't have to go to wort for the 
Navy." From that point on, things looted block. 
I agreed to go on a ·,oan basis for 18 •onths to 
see what could be done in that tirne. My secret 
ambition in that 18 months was simply to prove 
that nothing could be done and so go back to NASA. 
That, of course, 1 s where a part of the story 
I want to tell you tonight really lies because 
Admiral Kidd ca.e back from the fleet at that time. 
He was new to the Naval Material Command as its 
Chief. He came back with some very, very deep 
concerns about n!adiness, about the Navy's fighting 
ability. He expressed it to me in many terms, but 
I think it can best be expressed to you simply 
that he didn't believe the Navy could do the job 
with Hs curreM state of reliab111 ty of readiness. 
He was very worried. He had been side-by-side 
with the Russian Navy. He had seen it and he 
worried. He had come from the Mediterranean. When 
he saw me fighting coming to the Navy, he asked me 
to please keep an open mind. He said, "I '11 give 
you access to all the files, the systems, whatever 
you'd like to have in order to learn and understand 
what our proble• really is." 
Early In m1 life a lead engineer had told ne 
of an equation for success that I've always kept 
in mind. It ca-e to mind then, and I used it 
primarily as one of the basis for assessing "Why 
me?" in the Navy; why couldn't it be somebody 
else? This equat ion for success goes something 
1 ike this. 
First, you must know the problem. I went 
through the Nayy files; and as nearly as I could 
see, they knew the problem of fleet readiness, of 
unreliability, of trouble with equipment, as long 
as ten years ago. They couldn't have been after 
me just to lea111 the problem. They already knew 
what the proble. was; it's well documented. 
The second part of this equation for success 
is th•t you must have the proper tools. I looked 
through the system once again for tools. In this 
case there would be instructions, procedures, 
directives , specifications, etc. What I saw there 
was an abundance; it wasn't a lack. 
Later, 1 came to believe that the abundance I saw 
was really a part of the problem; it's called a 
Military Specification. I'd never seen a MIL-SPEC 
before. (I've lead a sheltered life, you see. 
I'll explain to you later.) HIL-SPECS were an 
anomaly In my life. As I look at them more and 
more, I've bec011e a sworn advocate of stamping out 
MIL-STDS . They just aren't what they clai m to be. 
As I said , the second part of the equation is 
tools, and I'd seen them. 
The third part of the equation was discipline. 
In other words, if you know the problem, have the 
tools, and have the discipline, you'll always 
succeed. I've followed that all my life and found 
it to be a very successful , simple equation. When 
I looked at discipline in the Navy, there's where 
I got my surprise. In Washington, where l'd 
worked in NASA, we were across the r1 ver from the 
DOD r.omplex. I could look out my window and see 
the Navy's bright braids shining in the sunlight, 
and I could see them smartly marching up and down 
the streets. 01sc1pline was the last thing in the 
world that I thought would be missing 1n the equa-
tion. But I did find that discipline was missing, 
and when I was relating this story to Admiral Kidd 
one day, he told me to look completely. I decided 
that the first place to look was in the Chief's 
own office, to see if he knew how to carry it out, 
because that's what he's in charge of--Naval 
Material. I went in to Ike one day and told him 
two stories which I'll relate to you one at a time. 
The first one involved this business of disci-
pline. I said, "Ike, I've looked through Naval 
Material Command records and I can relate it to you 
this way--! can remember as a youngster when the 
Mighty Moran aground in the Chesapeake. All they 
did was to wait for the high tide and float it off 
again, but the skipper of that ship never saw the 
light of day again." I also said, "Ike, there's 
one other thing that's obviously apparent to me. 
If you run a procurement aground, the only thing 
that happens to you is that you 'make flag.' That's 
absolutely a matter of record ." Now I don't say 
that derogatorily. What is really meant is this: 
The experience for promotion in the Navy comes from 
operational experience, not experience in Washing-
ton. There's not a program manager in Washington 
that's not anxious to get out of there as fast as 
he knows how; and he's rated on his ability to fly 
an airplane, sail a ship, or whatever it is he does 
from an operational point of view. His stay in 
Washington is as minimal as he can make it. He 
doesn't want to be there long, and he knows he's 
not going to get much of a rating out of hi~ per-
formance in Washington. So when I say he "makes 
flag," what I really mean is his interlude in the 
procurement world doesn't in any way have a lot to 
do with his promotion. It all comes from his oper-
ational ability. Following on with this little 
litany a minute, what I also want to poi nt out to 
you is a part of the looking that I did. 
The focus that the Navy has in front of it 
today was set by a study I did with three or four 
people I brought from NASA. We reviewed about 180 
contracts. I asked for 180 contracts, at random, 
of Naval procurements (some large items, some small 
items, some very small i terns) and looked through 
those. From this review we really found the major 
problem in the Navy's acquisition program. The 
Navy, today, is committed to change it, based on 
the visibility of that particular study. Of the 
180 contracts, I found three particularly signifi-
cant things. First, there wasn't one contract 
that had an enforceable reliability requirement in 
it. Any reliability requirements in the contracts 
could not be enforced; not a single one. There 
were two reasons: First, most of them were stated 
as goals. Having worked in industry long enough, 
I can tell you what a goal is . I just love con-
tracts written with goals that say you'll do the 
best you can and someday you'll get the answer 
whenever they give you enough money. Watch out 
for goals because nothing ever happens. That is 
very quantifiable. Second , those that weren't 
written in terms of goals were stated in terms of 
probability and statistics. You have to realize 
right away that anybody in ~he Naval Material 
world who deals in terms of probabilistics i s in-
tellectually dishonest. He's fooling himself, and 
he's fooling everybody because the population size 
is too small. It just doesn't wo.t. I can give 
you a point estimate with engineering judgment 
that has more accuracy e to the minus 1 ambda t 
carried to nine decimal places with a sample size 
of 500. It just doesn't work; it's speculation. 
But the even more damaging aspect of proba-
bilistics is that they're nonuseful to engineers . 
Back in the 1950's when I was designing electronics, 
I can remember when reliability caMe into vogue. 
We had never heard of the word. In 1953-55 relia-
bility started popping up. I can remember the 
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lead engineer coming to me and saying , "Will, this 
has got to be a reliable system here." I said, 
"Gee, what does that mea,,?" It was .99, .98, what-
ever the thing was. I said, "Chief, what does that 
mean?" He said, "It's got to be good. " Proba-
bilistics just don't do you any good; what we want 
is MTBF. HTBF is a useable item. It's just as 
useable as volume, weight, space, velocity, etc. 
But these contracts had none of that in the~. So 
our first observation was that they just weren't 
enforceable. None of the 180~ It didn't matter 
who you wrote them with, who they were for, what 
equipment they were for; they just were not en-
forceable. 
The second finding, and equally interesting, 
was that all the contractors in these 180 contracts 
gave the r~~ernment what it bargained for in per-
formance. As a matter of fact, more than thirty 
percent of the contractors gave us oore performance 
than we wanted. From a performance point of view, 
the records that Packard left behind seem to make 
a lot of sense. You c:M almnst le~vP. a c;ontract 
a lone when it comes to performance. It seems as 
though we can generally get what we want when it 
comes to performance. 
Out of this contract review came the thi rd 
part of the equation which i s really the one we're 
going to focus on tonight. Any reliability given 
to the Navy in the equipment, and any reliability 
that was ad!ieved , was an accident. It was seren-
dipity. It was what was left over after the per-
formance specification had been set. Any other 
attempt to put reliability in it was fallacious. 
It was just somebody picking a number out of thin 
air and writing it down, without basis. That led 
me to the real fundamental thing that we're talk-
ing about here tonight, and that is that reliabil-
ity must be a function of desi~n. It can't come 
by chance. One of the f1rst t ings I found when 
I came to DOD is that you have to have a slogan 
such as "design to cost." There's 1 ife cycle cost, 
all sorts of s l ogans, so the one we used was 
"reliability by design, not by chance. " The con-
tract review showed that all the reliability that 
carne to the Navy in its equipment was strictly by 
chance. The program manager primarily was being 
motivated by performance and a budget and schedule. 
Most of the time, he was in trouble in some way 
that you could trace back to the fact that the 
equipment wasn't reliable. It was taking him more 
ti~re in the test program, running his budget up, 
giving him trouble in the fleet. He was having to 
go out and do some fixing and that was running 
his budget up. Primarily, though, the schedu 1 e/ 
cost/budget problems he was having could be 
attributed to the fact that reliability was not 
part of his design. That puzzled 1111! because, you 
see, in mY experience (tracing backwards, before I 
came to NASA, I was at ARINC) re 1 i ability was a 
first requirement. When I was with the airlines, 
reliability was a first requirement. I had led a 
sheltered life because, in every case , reliability 
was desired and, as a matter of fact, required. 
In the case of Bell Labs, that was profit and loss 
and they designed 30 years in MTBF equipment; not 
30 hours or 30 minutes. Repeaters that go under 
the ocean have 35 to 40 years demonstrated MTBF 
today. Profit and loss: they don't have to pull 
those things up. Cables are very hard to service; 
they're trouble. What motivated that design was 
profit and loss. With the airlines it was profit 
and loss again; but in this case, safety was thrown 
in. The equipment the airlines dealt with had to 
be reliable; they had to be careful. In Apollo we 
were in a goldfish bowl and all of us, whether we 
wanted to or not, became very well acquainted with 
the astronauts. We loved them like brothers and 
tool< extra care simply because of our appreciation 
of the astronauts. All in al~. we were motivated. 
When I looked at the Navy and their program man-
agers and their procurement system, I saw nothiny 
motivating reliability--not a thing. There is 
where I saw the root cause of the problem: motiva-
tion. 
When I told Ike this, he asked me what I was 
going to do. I said, "The first thing I'm going to 
do is focus attention on the subject. I'm going to 
embarass people. I'm going to cause them to take 
second thoughts and ulti~ately we're going to re-
quire that perfonnance 111d reliability be given 
equal consideration in RFP's, in Navy thinking, in 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in 
the whole equation.• We have recently begun this 
in our institutionalizing process. We've issued a 
reliability Instruction in which it is required 
that reliability and perfonnance be equally con-
sidered in every aspect. Do not consider it 
second. If you can't make it reliable, don't start. 
I hove a little card in my pocket that I think 
is down-right amazing. This is called the Realis-
tic story, but it's Radio Shack. In it, Radio 
Shack has a very interesting paragraph that I think 
goes for anybody dealing in the equipment world. 1 
found ft remarkable for a manufacturer like this to 
state it quite this way, but this is how they 
stated ft: "Our people who design and build our 
products approach their task differently from con-
ventional makers. We build to achieve three things 
tn the following order. First, reliability; second, 
performance; third, coll\)Ct1tive price. We're not 
interested in price unless the product is reliable. 
We're not interested In price unless the performance 
meets our criteria for the way things work, look, 
feel best, and sound." So here's a little manu-
facturer just making equipment who has a better 
motto for reliability than I found in the Navy. 
As a matter of fact, it really fits the motto that 
I have now brought to the Navy. The Navy has now 
taken this on board with great vigor. 
At first, there WIS a lot of trouble. We did 
have a lot of problems in getting it understood. 
I think the main thing we had trouble with ~as the 
snapshot I took of what reliability really meant 
to the Navy when I went there. It was simply this: 
measurement, measurement. It was e to the minus 
lambda t. That was reliability: It was a culti st 
organ I za ti on run by s tati s ti ci ans with the engi-
neers completely out of the loop. It was done at 
the end of the develo~nt cycle. Sometimes, it 
was done after the production had stopped. I saw 
a squadron of airplanes going on a carrier. They 
were already on the carrier and production had 
already been turned off. I reviewed the contract 
and saw in it a reliability demonstration program: 
3.5 million dollars. I said we don't need to 
spend that money. There's nothing you can do 
about it; they're already on the deck of the 
carrier. Why do we want to demonstrate It? The 
flyers will tell us what it's all about pretty 
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quick. It doesn't take them long. I saw that 
.easurement was what we were pri.arily doing. 
Measurement is all right providing it's a closed 
loop measurement cycle. You have to realize in a 
•il itary procurement cycle that It Isn't closed 
loop. There's no time for it to be closed loop. 
If a measurement takes place at the end, then you 
do not have sufficient money to .ake the funda-
.ental corrections you should make to the equip-
.ent. The time you have for deltvery Is paramount 
because contractors who are buil ding ships will 
charge you for every day the equipment is delayed 
in delivery to them, so they find themselves in a 
bind. The equipment comes up for test and, guess 
what, it's a bust. It doesn't make any difference; 
they deliver it anyway . I can show you record 
after record of Navy materials flunking their 
demonstration tests and being delivered with a fix 
tit for the fleet. Of course, that's the box 
you 're in and I donLt blame anybody for that. 
If you wait to that point in time to get your 
snapshot of what reliability really is, then 
you've lost the game unless you just happen to 
pass. In a lot of cases the passing Is rigged. 
I've seen equipment that demonstrated 22 hours 
MTBF in a six-month scenario of " fleet environ-
~~ent." When it went out to the fleet, it was one-
ten th of an hour MTBF demonstrated. Why? Because 
it really never saw the fleet environment until it 
gat there no matter how hard we tried. I don't 
think anybody necessarily did It wrong on purpose. 
It's just impossible to demonstrate tnat kind of 
a thing that late in the program. It's got to be 
in a designer's mind; it's got to be part of the 
"mission profile" he designs to. That's the way 
we've always done it in our lifetime. We never 
waited on a demonstration to do it. What I 
really saw was that the present approach for re-
liability was really by chance. 
I thought that the only thing we could really 
do was to start an intellectual discourse with the 
engineers, with the managers, with everybody in-
volved, as to what they were really doing. We 
could cause them to start thinking a little bit 
and see if the thinking process wouldn't really 
1 ead them to the right answer. Over the past 
years, that's what I've done. I issued an instruc-
tion in April. I could have is5ued th<~t instruc-
tion when I first came two and one half years ago. 
Of course, it wouldn't have looted the same as it 
does today because I learned a l ittle and they 
learned a little. So together I think they have 
an instruction that is going to be supportable 
and which will cause an improve.ent in our relia-
bility. 
Let me ta 1 k to you just a •i nute about that 
same snapshot involving mi l itary standards. I 
blamed the problem of some of our fleet on mili-
tary standards. I haven't found a more damaging 
standard than HIL-ST0-7818, which is an environ-
~~ental test 5pocification for reliability demon-
stration and acceptance. We're better off to 
sto~ it out, to get rid of it. What 1 have now 
promoted is a change to MIL-ST0-781C. MIL-ST0-
781C has a lot of the good things in it I think 
we ought to have . Mi 1 ftary standards a ren' t 
really wrong; it's the way we use them. Most 
people have become so used to bo11erplating with 
military standards that they Sil!ply say if I'm 
going to have a reliability progra•, it's going to 
be in accordance with MIL-STD-785A. MIL-STD-785A 
tells you how to build everything from bullets to 
ships. You have to use your mind the minute you 
see a military spec1fi cation, to tailor it. There 
is a paragraph in these military specifications 
that se~ys to tailor the design to the situation and 
use what's applicable in the specification, but I 
haven't seen that done. Most people have gotten 
into the habit now of jUst taking the military 
specification and using it as is, without much 
intelligence and without much thinking about it. 
What we've had to do is to pull our reins in on 
the military specifications in those areas that 
are bothering us and say "You can't use them unless 
you come to us and tell us about the military 
specification you intend to implement; what parts 
of it are applicable to this design and what parts 
aren't?" 
One of the things I have in my office that 
makes all this possible (while I was still working 
for NASA, I did negotiate with the Navy what I con-
sidered to be something that was very necessary if 
we were really going to get on wi til the job with 
the Navy) is the authority to carry it out. I have 
a thing called a business clearance review which 
simply says that you don't go to contract with Navy 
unless you go through my office . Vhen those con-
tracts come through, we send them back if they 
haven't got the right requirements in them and we 
haven't said the right things . This has caused a 
1 ittle bit of controversy, a 1 ittle bit of a 
problem. As I told someone at supper time, you 
may have noticed that the crime rate in Washington 
has gone down according to the records. There is 
no doubt in my mind this is true because the Navy 
has hired all the hit men out of Washington to see 
what they can do about me. 
There is no doubt we do have a problem which 
we're trying to solve ; part of it being to get 
attention focused in the right places. The main 
thing we have found is that combat effectiveness 
is really a function of economic effectiveness. 
We're finding that the greatest economic level for 
reliab111ty 1mprovement in the fleet comes in the 
design process. It uses less money and involves 
less time. You can erase a resistor on a drawing 
board whereas if you replace it in the fleet, it 
costs you millions and millions of dollars. With-
out really knowing what I was doing, I recently 
approved a no-cost Engineering Change Proposal 
(ECP) to change a capacitor in a plece of equip-
ment that was out in the fleet. When we were 
done, it cost three million dollars because we 
had to change publications, training , standards, 
and te~ t e4u i pment. All I did was approve the no-
cost ECP for a capacitor. There is no such thing, 
fellas. When it gets in the fleet it's a costly 
process. This is what the Navy is finding out. 
The economic leverage isn't where it was. That is 
today, of course, the biggest asset I think we 
have in helping us get this reliability equation 
solved--the economics of the budget. We are find-
ing ourselves with a shrinking budget, and we're 
not able to buy what we could buy before; you 
l1ave to rea 1 i ze that the 1 arge majority of the 
Navy's money goes into spare parts and product 
support. 
When I first came to the Navy, what worried 
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me most was how to get attention focused on design 
when by admission of every contractor, his .ain 
money making source was parts and support. That 
worried me greatly. I went out to see a few con-
tractors. Not long ago Harry Graves, President of 
United Technology, even put it in writing in 
Aviation Week, that 30 to 40 percent of United 
Technology's profit structure was parts and support. 
While that equation got changed (not due to any-
thing I did) because of inflation shrinking the 
ability to buy with the dollar, what we found our-
selves doing more and more was buying less and 
less new equipment. This means no new starts for 
the industry. This means a technological base 
freeze , literally. We just can't do anything new; 
all we can do is support what we've got. In brief-
ing industry, I have called their attention to 
starting to design . for reliability now if you 
intend to keep a technological base because it's 
going to stop. We're just not going to buy any 
new equipment. If you look through the Na~·s 
records, you will find there is very little new 
equipment being bought. Most of it is reprocure-
ment and update of old equipment. There is some 
new equipment, of co•urse, but not nearly to the 
extent we ought to have. We have set into being 
what we call a "new look," a new way of doing 
business. In that new way of doing business, 
we've published a little thing for public relations 
or public information. It says in one word what 
the Navy is going to do. It says what you 11ust do 
in terms of kFP's, bids , designs, etc. It says 
to contractors that unless you follow these, 
you're just not going to do business with the Navy. 
At first there was a little doubt about that, but 
it soon went away. We have it pretty well under-
stood now that this is the method by which we're 
going to do business. As I said before, the 
biggest thing we have to do is get the reliability 
decision-making process up early. We have to 
decide if it's going to be a reliable device early 
in the design. We have to lose this infatuation 
with perfor.ance. 
The c~rcial industry has lost its infatua-
tion with performance. When you go out to buy 
something in the con-.nercial world or your wife 
goes to buy something, you don't ask how many 
times the washing machine jiggles up and down or 
what kind of a defrosting cycle your refrigerator 
has, etc. The main thing you ask the commercial 
industry is whether it's durable, is it reliable, 
how long will it last? You've seen the ad for 
Maytag washing machines where the poor maintenance 
guy is just out of business and crying because he 
has nothing to do (a little exaggerated because 
I own one). Nevertheless , in principle, it is 
focused about right. They have done a good job. 
The RCA XL-100 is a good example, and I happen to 
know that RCA didn't get there by accident. That 
set was held off the market for quite awhile while 
they worked on limited life. I don't know whether 
you have had any bad experiences with them or not, 
but the bas1c concepts are there. Most of the 
industry is trying to work on a product life. The 
only people who aren't working on it right now 
(who weren't working on it, I should say) is the 
Navy. We're working on it right now. The new 
approach s~s that we are going to design it in 
and we are going to make sure that the concepts 
have been considered early in the game. The 
reason we want to do this is to reduce what 
Admi ra 1 Ki dd called an "umbil i ca 1 to the beach." 
I stand here tonight and very sincerely say 
to you that I worry in terms of our defense posture 
with the U. S. Navy after having seen some of the 
Russian technology through the Soyez Visibility. 
I have come to a personal conclusion I want to ex-
press to you tonight. The thing that motivates 
me to continue under all the stress and duress in 
the Naval Material Co.marid is to make sure that 
this project does get carried out and that the Navy 
does change its way of doing business. I'm moti-
vated simply by this: I'm convinced that our 
sophistication is the problem we have in our equip-
ment. The Russian technology is not very sophisti-
cated; it is very unsophisticated equipment. If 
you simply take a quick snapshot of what that 
means if the two forces were engaged, you have to 
come to the following conclusion: If it's a short 
engagement we would be the superior; if it's a long 
engagement, I think we'll have a problem. Sophisti-
cation without life gives you only the original big 
bang. For instance, we can have a plane that can 
leave an aircraft carrier and go do a mission and 
come back, but he can't do it twice. Oh, I may 
rectify it while he's down; however, some of their 
equipment can go up over and over and over again. 
They can't do as sophisticated a mission and they 
can't track multiple targets, but the point is 
that they have the sustaining power. What I'm 
dedicated to doing is seeing that this performance, 
which is so good, also has life. If you put life 
into our performance equation, it's unbeatable; 
it's absolutely unbeatable. When things get tough 
and I get tired, I always reflect back to that 
particular snapshot that I had and I come on again 
with new vigor to see to it that we carry out this 
new Navy program. 
In order to do that, we've also created 
another slogan which we call "Big R, Little m." 
In other words, we want reliability in our equip-
ment and we want it to have minimum maintenance 
because I saw in my snapshot of the fleet that our 
maintenance problem is truly bad. It's tough. I 
went out on the carrier, the AMERICA, and before I 
knew the Navy's re 1 i abi 1 i ty prob 1 ems were for rea 1 , 
I even agreed to fly in an F-14. It was only 
later that I woke up to my indiscretion. Since 
this is a technological symposium, let me tell you 
something. The Navy does do things they don't 
take credit for. I a. completely convinced that 
the Navy has invented the elusive time machine 
that everybody talks about. When I went on the 
F-14, while we were sitting on the catapult waiting 
to leave the deck, the pilot up front gave the 
catapult officer a salute; and he said to me, "Will, 
if you're comfortable back there, you give a thumb's 
up." While we were sitting there on the catapult, 
the pressure was raised, the engines were run up, 
the pilot gave his salute, and I raised my thumb. 
Even though only one second passed, it seemed like 
days because I looked at that finger and said, 
"You fool, what have you done?" It was a valuable 
experience. I learned a lot. 
What I saw out there were tired people, 
maintenance people who had lost their enthusiasm 
for maintenance because, as one fellow said, "It 
doesn't do any good to repair it; it'll be back 
the next day." I put an "X" on the box and said 
let's look at that one when you're done . He fin-
11 
ished testing it; I stood right there and said 
"Okay, I'll put my initials right here." I told 
him I'd be back tomorrow night. I went back the 
next night and he was grinning. There it was. 
This is bad motivation for maintenance people. 
How would you like to keep repairing something 
over and over again and just see it fail, see it 
come back. Pretty soon you just have an "I don't 
give a heck" attitude. I am also dedicated to 
helping those fellows change their attitude be-
cause, as I told them, they're our stewards. We 
dedicate that equipment to the. and yet part of 
what we give them is junk, just pure junk. We 
say to them take care of it, treat it right. You 
and I wouldn't buy it if we went to the market-
place to buy some of that equipment; it would 
never get sold because we know better. What we 
have done is to emphasize reliibility by design. 
We've now brought 'the process up to the front end 
of the contract 'l.nd said "Measurement is not very 
important any more." We are going to have measure-
ments for contractual reasons; there is no way a 
contractor can be released unless he has demon-
strated he did what you asked him to do. What 
we're not going to do is make decisions based on 
that measurement data. We're simply going to 
release him from his obligation if he did the 
demonstration like he was supposed to, and we're 
not going to put a lot of bucks in it. 
Instead, we are transferring the money up to 
the front end of the contract ind we are asking 
them to do things that are on this particular card. 
This little card was really made as a flyer for 
the instruction that came out so that some people 
who didn't want to read the whole instruction 
could see it right here on one card. In this 
thing, we have the requirement "design to minimize 
failure." That is really what it is all about. 
First of all, you have a mission profile which is 
a Navy responsibility. This one you don't lay at 
the feet of the contractors. Most of the equip-
ment I saw in the Navy didn't have a fighting 
chance because no one had said what the mission 
profile was going to be. We had simply told the 
contractor to make it so it will operate in some 
unknown environment for some unknown number of 
cycles. He can't do that. The designer must know 
what you intend to do with the equipment, how you 
intend to use it. We have had a very difficult 
problem getting this ironed out, but we finally 
got the specifications, etc., out, and people are 
responding to the mission profile. Some of them 
are a little weak, but they are getting better. 
For a while I didn't think I had a chance, to be 
honest with you. It looked like it just couldn't 
be done . I've seen responses in the last year 
that have shown that people are starting to think 
and are recognizing the same thing I recognize. 
If we do want a Navy, we want it to be a good 
Navy. Therefore, we have to put some time into 
product life. We have also said that we want you 
to do environmental profiles. We want to know the 
environment in which the equip.ent is going to be 
operating. We want not only the performance pro-
file, but the environmental profile. Following 
up on that, we are now asking the contractor to 
give us a design that is understressed, not over-
stressed. Reliability is simply a function of 
stress. Once you realize that, there is nothing 
else to the problem. All you have to do now is 
figure out a way to solve it. 
Reliability is a function of stress, so in 
order to get the stress levels understood and to 
minimize the stress on equipment, we have set 
standards. We have said you will derate all of 
your components to our standards and we have the 
list of standards you will use. For instance, we 
have set junction temperatures inside of semi-
conductors. A junction temperature is what governs 
the 1 i fe of a semiconductor. For every ten degrees 
you derate a junction temperature, you double its 
life. In studies they did years ago, HASA and Bell 
Labs set certain junction temperatures. Bell Labs' junction temperatures run between 50-600C. NASA 
said because of weight limitations, space environ-
ment, etc., we must have lOOOC junction temperature. 
Would you care to guess what I found the Navy's junction temperatures to be running. They were 
170-2400C. Just remember that for every ten degrees 
you double the life of the device. Just like a 
light bulb, you cannot stress it too hard. What 
we have now done is said to the designer, "We want 
you to follow our derating criteria; we want you 
to follow our design criteria, but we also want 
you to make stress analyses." It's funny that you 
talk about nondestructive testing here, and yet 
for some reason your electronic COillllunity has 
known for years that electrons running through the 
wires are just as damaging to components as cars 
are to bridges. I could find reams of mechanical 
stress analyses for all the equipment we bought, 
but I couldn't find the first piece of data for 
electronic stress analyses. It is very well known 
and understood. 
We have told the contractor to make a stress 
analysis on every decision, mechanical and elec-
trical. Not only that, we will sit down and 
review it to see if he did it right. Now there 
lies the hooker because the Navy has to be able 
to review it to see if it is right . We do have 
the manpower and the talent, and we must run them 
together right now to see that it all gets done 
properly. We've ilso done sneak circuit analysis 
which 1~ASA originated. It isn't too well known, 
but it 1s a very worthwhile tool for understanding 
what stresses you have on your circuits. I'll 
give you an example of one that you may have in 
your automobiles right now. I will give you two 
because I just read another one fr~n Detroit the 
other night. 
A sneak circuit is an unplanned event that 
takes place due to a malfunction in a component 
part or a misoperation which opens up a path that 
had not been nonaally analyzed to be there. An 
example is in your automobile. If you own a 1975 
Ford or General Kotors product, here's a sneak 
circuit. You know that when you get in your car 
and your ignition is turned off on the post, 
nothing will happen when you turn on your radio 
because you haven't got the column turned on. 
What you have to do in this case is to turn on 
your radio, leave the column turned off, reach 
underneath the key and pull out the emergency 
flasher (the thing that makes all sorts of lights 
go on your car). How put on your brakes and your 
car radio will play. That's a fact! I've had 
people rush out and run back in while I was talk-
ing to them and say yep, that's right. That's a 
fact! 
Yesterday I read another one that says all 
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owners of Cadillacs are asked to bring their 
Cadillacs back in. (I'd SiY anybody that owns a 
Cadillac deserves it.) All Cadillac owners were 
asked to bring their cars back in to have a printed 
circuit board replaced. If you have an electric 
door lock on your Cadillac, when you move the 
transmission from neutral into drive, it pulses 
it into the unlocked position. Now you're asked 
to bring it back and they'll give you another PC 
board. In the technical note it says that it 
keeps the electrons from being confused. Well, 
they're right. The electrons do become confused. 
All I was trying to summarize here in this 
little bit on reliability by design is simply the 
fact that it's the place ~ere the money is to be 
made in the world today if you're interested in 
seeing to it that reliable systems are brought on 
board. There is another part of this that worried 
me; and because I talked about it too much, I 
found it in my shop not too long ago. I got a 
call from Admiral Michaelis one night and he said, 
"Wi1 1 , we've been 1 i steni ng to what you've said 
and we've decided to give you that responsibility 
too." There are a lot of indications that we are 
having success in the design world, but the thing 
that I'm worried about now is quality assurance, 
or quality control. What I'm worried about is 
whether it's built to print. I've worked in 
plan Ls where we wuul d do the thing right in de-
sign, but it wasn't built like that. I thought 
it was in another shop and it was, but it just 
simply melted into mine. Maybe I should not have 
said anything, but I had i very sincere motiva-
tion. You can design it right, but if you don't 
build it to print you've got a problem. I saw 
all the indications that our build-to-print 
visibility wasn't working very well. I went out 
to contractor's plants (with them kicking and 
scream! ng), pi eked up boards, and brought them 
home just to show defects on them, to the Material 
Command personnel, to let them know what we've 
got to worry about. That' s another part of the 
equation: build-to-print. I now have reliability, 
quality, maintainability, production and engi-
neering. I don't know quite how to handle all that 
yet because my focus is still on reliability 
which I think is the principal problem the Navy 
is facing. 
In closing, let me give you a little bit of 
insight into some of the things 1 think would 
interest you tonight. I said earlier in my 
opening remarks that I was going to give you some 
snapshots of what I thought was an exciting period 
in the Navy right now and what it meant to non-
destructive engineering and nondestructive testing. 
In this world today I see that reliability has to 
be the focal point of just about everything for 
awhile because there are t lot of things happening 
in the world that aren't in the Naval Material 
Collllland. We've seen what happens in co a 1 when 
fuel and gasoline, fossil fuels, etc., start to 
get scarce. I see that we are also going to find 
a scarcity of some of our natural resources. Not 
long ago, Don wrote a paper that elegantly put 
that in perspective. It says something like "At 
the current rate of use, .e have 40 to 70 years 
before our natural resources are gone." Why? Be-
cause we' re in a throw away society. Because we' re 
at a p 1 ace where re 1 i ability hadn't been under-
stood; but in some of the lesser complicated 
things where a lot of money is being spent, it is 
understood; but in sone of the lesser complicated 
things, we tend to build anew. We say throw it 
away. I'm raised with a mind that tells me that 
isn't the right way to do business. Waste not, 
want not. I learned that years ago, but I find 
that today's society may be cultivating something 
that is going to cause us want later on. We 
haven't focused on the fact that reliability is an 
important equation in any design, and I'm pushing 
it very hard. The fix-the-fleet business, as the 
Navy calls it, is a serious problem for me. I 
don't like to see them waste all that money going 
out there and fixing the fleet. It costs millions 
of dollars to fix something in the fleet when we 
could do it very cheaply when we're designing it. 
I am reminded of something here that I'd quickly 
like to tell you on fix-the-fleet. It's a story 
that I think will emphasize it to you very care-
fully. 
At one time, this town had what was known as 
the town drunk. The wife of this particular per-
son was very much embarassed over the situation, 
and for a number of years she tried to convince 
Charlie to go on the wagon and stop drinking. 
Finally, he accepted the chall enge. For a long 
time he stayed on the wagon until one night he 
went out with the boys. They convinced him to 
have a few, and then he knew he was in trouble. 
All the way home he devised a plan for how he was 
going to get into the house without his wife know-
ing he had been drinking. He very carefully 
devised a plan. He went up to the front door and 
looked and listened. The house was quiet, no 
lights were on, so he said okay, I can get in the 
house. If I can get in the house without her 
hearing me, I'll be all right. He got in the front 
door, stood in the hallway, and everything was 
quiet. Then he had a set of stairs to go up, and 
he decided that the best way to go up the stairs 
was to take off his shoes because then he could go 
up more quietly. He took off his shoes and started 
up the stairs. Being in his stocking feet and 
with the stairs being a little slippery, he fell . 
When he did, he had a bottle in his pocket and it 
cut his north side right badly . So he got up again 
and listened and everything was quiet. He said 
well now, I'll just go in the bathroom and patch 
myself up and I've got it made . So he goes into 
the bathroom, opens up the medicine chest, gets 
out the bandaids, backs up to the mirror and fixes 
himself up. He goes on to bed very quietly, turns 
out the light, and his wife hasn't heard him be-
cause she was asleep. He says, I have it made; 
she didn't know. The next morning she gives him 
holy hell. She wants to know why he'd been out 
drunk last night. He said how could you possibly 
know I was out drunk last night. She said why 
else would those bandaids be all over the bathroom 
mirror? I submit to you tonight, even though 
you're laughing, that when we go out to the fleet, 
we're putting bandaids on the bathroom mirror. 
That is what we're trying to stop. We don't want 
any bandaids on the bathroom mirror. 
Part of the problem has been the staying power 
within the Navy which has caused this to happen. 
I happen to be the focal point for this in the 
Navy. I know it so well for the simple reason 
that about a year after I was there, as I was go-
ing out of my office to see Ike Kidd a minute, I 
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saw a piece of paper on the hall floor which I 
reached down and picked up. It was a little 
square sheet of paper that had my name across 
the top and had a matrix on it. There were a lot 
of numbers written on it and dates, etc. I said 
to myself, what in the world is this? I went in 
to see Ike. When I was there I said, "Hey, I 
found this on the floor. What is this, Ike? Do 
you know what it is?" He looked at it a minute 
and broke out l aughing. He said, "Well, this is 
an anchor pool." Now I don't know if you know 
what an anchor pool is, but I didn't. The Navy 
has a custom; when a ship goes into a harbor, you 
make wagers on the exact time (day, hour, second, 
whatever) that the anchor goes over the side; and 
the one closest to the exact time collects the 
pool. I said, "Well, that's interesting, Ike; 
but what's that got to do with me?" He said, 
"This is an anchor pool on when you're leaving." 
That wasn't too bad until several days later when 
I got a telephone call. The telephone call went 
like this. The cal ler wouldn't identify himself, 
but he wanted to know if I knew there was an anchor 
pool out on my leaving. I said yes; it has come 
to my attention several times now. He said, "I just wanted to know if you'd do me a favor. If 
you plan on leaving in the month of May, would 
you make it on the 23rd?" I haven't seen any 
anchor pool s lately b~cause I think people have 
taken me more seriously. I believe the Navy has 
mustered its best effort. I believe they really 
are charging on down the right road now. I be-
lieve we have a few years before we are going to 
get there; but we are going to get there. There 
is no doubt in my mind about it. I am determined 
to see it through, and I think it takes determin-
ation to see it through. I have had an experience 
in my life that gave me an awful lot of determin-
ation. 
In the early 1970's, the doctors told me I 
had three months to 1 i ve. I was diagnosed as 
having cancer, articular cell sarcoma. They 
said , "That's such a fast disease you won't even 
make it around the corner ." Through the good Lord 
and the science of medicine, I am sti l l here today . 
I haven't got all my health back, but enough that 
I am satisfied. 
The point I am trying to make is that this 
is a part of what I am determined to do. I am 
determined to see the Navy get what they want be-
cause they want it so badly. Sure, there are 
forces that try not to let it happen, but it is 
going to happen. 
I want to give you one more il l ustration. 
It has been a long road over the past four years, 
and it has been a long hard road. With the 
issuance of that instruction, I now see that there 
is some light at the end of the tunnel. To illus-
trate it to you in a more remarkable way, I would 
like to tell you the story of the farmer who 
crossed a chicken with a cow . When he crossed a 
chicken with a cow, he got a funny looking animal. 
They couldn't figure out what to call the animal; 
so the son of the farmer said, "We ought to call 
it a raribird. It's an unusual looking animal." 
Through the years they were raising the raribird; 
they kept feeding it and feeding it; and it got 
bigger and bigger. Finally, they discussed the 
matter one night and said, "We've got to get rid 
 of this raribird. It's just eating us out of house 
and home." They tried to figure out just how they 
would do this. Finally, they devised a plan to 
take the raribird to a cliff. They put him in a 
truck one night, drove to a cliff, and said, "We're 
going to push the rarlbird over the cliff." They 
pushed and pulled and tugged, and the raribird 
wouldn't get out of the truck. While ther were 
doing that, the kid said, "I know what we ve got 
to do. We've got to get a big stick so we can tip 
th1s fellow out of here. We've just got to pry 
him out." While the kid had gone to get the stick, 
the fanner's neighbor calli! up and saw the raribird 
in the truck. He walked up to the edge of the 
cliff and asked the fanner what he was going to 
do. The fanner said, "We've got to get rid of 
this raribird. The kid has gone to get a stick so 
we can tip him out of the truck and push him over 
the cliff." Then the fanner's neighbor looked up 
at the raribird, looked over the cliff and said, 
"That's a long way to tip a rar1. • 
Gentlemen, it has been my plea.sure to be here 
tonight to talk to you and to try to share with 
you a little enthusiasm. I believe the Navy does 
have enthusiasm for what they are doing. I know 
I have enthusiasm for what I am doing. I believe 
that reliability is an integral part of nondestruc-
tive engineering; and I believe that you play a 
large part in that equation because it is through 
you that we have assurance of our product. I 
believe that if you are fighting a tough road , join the crowd. Any time we try to change man's 
Mind, try to introduce new thought, we automati-
cally have a problen and it takes time. I submit 
to you that from what I have heard tonight, and 
from what I have read of you~ proceedings, you are 
making progress. I believe that if you continue, 
you will get there. When you do, I am sure we 
will have a more reliable product; and we, in the 
Navy, promise to support you. Thank you. 
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